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Abstract—The Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack is a cyber-
attack in which an attacker intercepts traffic, thus harming
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the network. It
remains a popular attack vector due to its simplicity. However,
existing solutions are either not portable, suffer from a high false
positive rate, or are simply not generic.
In this paper, we propose Vesper: a novel plug-and-play MitM
detector for local area networks. Vesper uses a technique inspired
from impulse response analysis used in the domain of acoustic
signal processing. Analogous to how echoes in a cave capture the
shape and construction of the environment, so to can a short and
intense pulse of ICMP echo requests model the link between two
network hosts. Vesper uses neural networks called autoencoders
to model the normal patterns of the echoed pulses, and detect
when the environment changes. Using this technique, Vesper is
able to detect MitM attacks with high accuracy while incurring
minimal network overhead.
We evaluate Vesper on LANs consisting of video surveillance
cameras, servers, and PC workstations. We also investigate sev-
eral possible adversarial attacks against Vesper, and demonstrate
how Vesper mitigates these attacks.
Index Terms—Man in the middle, anomaly detection, echo-
analysis, LAN security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Man-in-the-Middle attack (MitM) is where a malicious
third party takes control of a communication channel between
two or more endpoints by intercepting and forwarding the
traffic in transit. An attacker in the middle has the capability
of harming the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
user’s content, by eavesdropping, manipulating, crafting, and
dropping traffic on the network. In general, the MitM attack
model on a local area network (LAN) has three steps: (1) gain
access to the network, (2) intercept traffic in transit, and (3)
manipulate, craft, or drop traffic.
Depending on the scenario, access can be achieved by
connecting to a public Wi-Fi access point (e.g. at a café,
airport...) or by connecting physically to an exposed network
cable or network switch. The attacker can also conduct this
attack remotely via a malware which has infected a trusted
computer within the existing network [1]. After gaining access,
interception can be achieved by exploiting known vulnerabili-
ties in network protocols. For example, the attacker can poison
a host’s address resolution protocol (ARP) table to capture
local traffic [2]–[4], or spoofing a domain name server (DNS)
to intercept all web traffic [5]–[7]. The attacker can easily
exploit these vulnerabilities with free tools which work out-of-
the-box such as Ettercap, Cain and Abel, Evilgrade, arpspoof,
dsniff, and many others.
Although MitM attacks on LANs have been known for
some time, they are still considered a significant threat [8],
[9], and have gained academic attention over the years. This
is likely because the attack is relatively easy to achieve, yet
challenging to detect [10]. Encryption can protect the integrity
and confidentiality of the traffic in transit. However, according
to [11], 30% of the world’s web traffic is not encrypted.
Furthermore, in many cases networked systems do not encrypt
their traffic by default (e.g., SCADA control system [12]).
Moreover, even if the traffic is encrypted, encryption protocols
may have flaws [13], [14], be misconfigured, or simply left out
by a manufacturer (e.g. CVE-2017-15643). We also note that
LAN-based MitM attacks are used in APTs to achieve lateral
movement [15]. Therefore, there is a need for detecting the
presence of a MitM, even when encryption is employed.
A. The Proposed Solution
Our proposed solution is inspired by signal processing
domain. In a dynamic system, the output (reaction) of the
system to a short input signal is called impulse response.
A common use of impulse responses is the modeling and
recreation of acoustic environments, such as small rooms or
concert halls. As an intuitive example, one can hear the IR of
a room by clapping their hands. The sound of the clap changes
based on the size, shape, and materials of the room.
Using this concept, we propose a MitM detector called
Vesper. Vesper bats are the largest and best-known family
of the bat species. Akin to it name, our detector captures
the impulse response of a LAN by measuring the round-trip-
times (RTT) resulting from a short intense burst of ICMP
echo requests. This impulse response is used to model the
normal behavior of the network in the perspective of two
communicating hosts. When a third party intercepts traffic,
the harmonic composition of the impulse response between the
hosts changes significantly. Vesper detects this change using
an autoencoder neural network as an anomaly detector. In this
paper, we show how Vesper works with various devices, in the
presence of diverse traffic, and across multiple switches. We
also show how Vesper is robust against adversarial attacks.
B. Contributions
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
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• A novel method for detecting the presence of a MitM
attack on a LAN via echo-analysis. The method is non-
intrusive (no packet inspection), incurs a minimal over-
head on the network, and is not dependent of the hardware
and software of the LAN or the attacker’s device.
• A framework for deploying the technique on a LAN
(Vesper). The framework is plug-and-play, which makes
the detection method practical. The framework has been
designed to resist an evasive adversary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sections II
and III, we present the MitM attack model and related works
respectively. In section IV, we provide a background on echo
analysis, and introduce our technique (ping echo analysis).
In section V, we present the framework for MitM detection
in LANs via ping echo analysis (Vesper). In section VI, we
present evaluations of Vesper on several different networks.
In section VII, we present possible adversarial attacks against
Vesper and the respective countermeasures. Finally, in section
VIII, we conclude our paper.
II. THE ATTACK MODEL
In this section we describe the MitM attack model used
throughout the paper. We also enumerate the attacker’s re-
quirements, attack vectors, and capabilities.
A. Attack Scenario
Let Alice and Bob be victims located on the same LAN
segment, where the LAN segment may contain one or more
network switches. Let Eve be the attacker whose objective is
to perform a MitM attack between Alice and Bob. In other
words, Eve wants to manipulate the traffic sent between Alice
and Bob, while being able to craft new traffic as well (e.g.,
sending ARP packets). Eve has physical access to the LAN’s
infrastructure, and can install malware on a network host other
than Alice and Bob.
B. Attack Topologies
Eve can accomplish her objective by establishing one of the
following MitM topologies (illustrated in Fig. 1):
End-Point (EP) MitM. Eve either adds a new host, or com-
promises an existing host on the LAN. Eve then causes
the traffic in transit between the Alice and Bob to flow
through her device (e.g., via ARP poisoning or some other
protocol-based MitM attack).
In-Line (IL) MitM. Eve locates an exposed network cable
which Alice and Bob use to communicate. Eve then
covertly installs a device which passes all traffic from
one side of the wire to the other, while being able to
manipulate/inject traffic.
In-Point (IP) MitM. Eve locates an exposed network switch
which Alice and Bob use to communicate. Eve then
swaps the switch with a new switch that has additional
logic enabling her to manipulate/inject traffic.
Unlike the EP MitM, IL and IP MitM attacks can only be
accomplished by introducing additional hardware. Therefore,
these attacks require physical access to the LAN.
Fig. 1: The three LAN MitM attack topologies.
C. Classes of Attacks
MitM attacks in a LAN vary based on their stealth and
complexity. For example, a more covert attack is typically
more difficult for the attacker to accomplish. We categorize
the class of a MitM attack based on the MitM topology, and
implementation used. Table I summarizes these classes, and
their notations which we use throughout the paper.
We note that although an IP-DH MitM is very hard to
detect, it is also very hard for the attacker to accomplish. This
is because (1) network switches are typically stored under
lock and key, and (2) modern switches provide a password
protected administrator console (the attacker must copy the
configurations prior to the swap).
There are two reasons why such a MitM will buffer each
and every inbound packet: (1) to avoid signal collisions on
the media when transmitting crafted/altered packets, and (2)
to capture and alter relevant packets before they reach their
intended destination. In the latter case, the MitM must parse
every frame in order to determine the frame’s relevancy to
the attack, and cannot retroactively stop a transmitted frame.
Therefore, the interception process (hardware and/or software)
will affect the timing of network traffic. We note that since
passive wiretaps only observe traffic, they are not MitM
attacks and therefore not in the scope of this paper. However,
Vesper can detect a MitM which is presently eavesdropping
(not currently altering traffic) because a MitM always buffers
each packet upon reception. Fig. 2 illustrates the basic packet
interception process for all MitM implementations.
III. RELATED WORKS
In our review of related works, we will focus on MitM
attacks which the target communication channels [9], and we
will also only focus on solutions which are concerned with
the data link layer of the OSI model.
In the past decade, many different detection schemes have
been proposed in order to address MitM attacks. In general,
the solutions to MitM attacks on LANs address a specific flaw
in a protocol [3], [5], [6], [16], [17]. As an example, consider
the infamous vulnerability in the Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP). The vulnerability gives untrusted hosts the ability to
spread spoofed ARP messages, causing network traffic to be
Fig. 2: The packet interception process for (1) an EP MitM, (2-3) an IL MitM, (4) an IP MitM, and (4) a passive wiretap.
TABLE I: Summary of MitM Attacks on a LAN
TD: Traffic Diversion EP: End-Point  
  NB: Network Bridge IL: In-Line  
DH: Dedicated Hardware IP: In-Point  
  1 2 3 4 5 
Type 
Topology EP IL IL IP IL 
Implementation TD NB DH DH DH 
Attack 
Vectors 
Gain physical access to switch X X X X X 
Connect to Ethernet wall socket X     
Install malware on existing host X     
Install device on strategic wire  X X  X 
Traffic 
Intercepted 
All traffic in LAN X     
Local traffic only  X X X X 
Can alter and inject traffic? X X X X  
Can be detected by Vesper? X X X   
 
 
 
TD: Traffic Diversion EP: End-Point  
  NB: Network Bridge IL: In-Line  
DH: Dedicated Hardware IP: In-Point  
- low,  ○ medium,  ● high,  ★ very-high 1 2 3 4 5 
Type 
Topology EP IL IL IP IL 
Implementation TD NB DH DH DH 
Attack 
Vectors 
Gain physical access to switch X X X X X 
Connect to Ethernet wall socket X     
Install malware on existing host X     
Install device on strategic wire  X X  X 
Traffic 
Intercepted 
All traffic in LAN X     
Local traffic only  X X X X 
Can the MitM alter and inject traffic? X X X X  
Complexity of the MitM attack - ○ ● ★ ○ 
Vesper’s detection of the MitM attack ★ ★ ● ○ NA 
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routed to the attacker’s device. Solutions to this flaw include
improved protocols [2], [18], [19] and the integration of new
security features [20].
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been proposed as
a more generic way for dealing with MitM attacks. These
IDSs include software-based IDSs [21] and hybrid hard-
ware/software IDSs (e.g., an add-on component plugged into
the mirror port of a switch) [10].
However, these solutions have limitations:
Generalization. Many of these solutions address a flaw in
a specific protocol, and therefore cannot be generalized
to other or unknown MitM attacks occurring in the
LAN. For example, detecting an exploitation of the ARP
protocol does not solve the issue of an IL MitM.
Portability. Some of these solutions require additional hard-
ware or other costly resources. For example, a separate
network host which acts as an IDS.
False Positives. Network traffic tends to be noisy, making
it difficult to detect the presence of a MitM based on
traffic patterns and packet contents. Therefore, searching
network packets for evidence of a MitM may lead to a
large number of false positives [10].
Regardless, all of the related solutions are weak to IL MitM
attacks, since they leave no forensic evidence in the packets.
On the other hand, Vesper is portable and can detect both EP
and IL MitM attacks. Furthermore, Vesper is robust since it
analyzes its own probes and not the traffic of others.
In [22], the authors propose a method for detecting when
an end-user’s Network Interface Card (NIC) has been changed
to promiscuous mode (e.g., sniffing via Wireshark). They
accomplish this by creating an RTT dataset for each host
in the network, categorized by the host’s operating system.
Each dataset contains the average, standard deviation, and ratio
between the statstics with and without the sniffer active on the
end-point. The authors then use z-statistics over these datasets
to determine if a host has activated a sniffer.
Our work differs from [22] in the following ways:
1) The technique in [22] detects hosts operating in promis-
cuous mode, but not necessarily acting as a MitM.
2) The solution in [22] requires the network administrator
to manually collect a data set from each device in
his/her network; with and without promiscuous mode
on. Our technique is transparent, and provides a fully
unsupervised plug-and-play solution.
3) The solution in [22] is weak against replay attacks. Our
solution is robust against these attacks because we utilize
features extracted from randomized signals.
IV. ECHO ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the probing technique used by
Vesper to capture the presence of a MitM. Later in section
V, we show how Vesper uses this technique to actively detect
MitM attacks.
A. Notations and Definitions
In order describe our technique, we now briefly present
some common notations and definitions from the domain of
signal processing [23].
Signal. A signal, in this paper, is a discreet sequence of values
sampled at the rate fs (measured in units of Hz). Let x
be a signal where x[t] denotes the value of that signal at
time index t.
System. In signal processing, a system S can be represented
as a ‘black box’ which receives an input signal x and
produces an output signal y. This process is denoted as
S(x) = y.
LTI System. A special class of systems that are both linear
and time–invariant. A system is linear if (1) it obeys the
additivity principal in that the input x[t] = x1[t] + x2[t]
produces the output y[t] = y1[t] + y2[t], and (2) it obeys
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Fig. 3: Two common excitation signals used to extract impulse
responses from acoustic environments.
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Fig. 4: Example impulse responses extracted from various
acoustic environments.
the homogeneity principle in that for an input x[t] and its
output y[t], it holds that the response for ax[t] is ay[t].
A system is time-invariant if the output does not depend
on when the input was applied.
Excitation Signal. A brief input signal x which has been
crafted to capture the dynamic reaction of S within the
output y.
Impulse Response. An impulse response signal h of the LTI
system S is the output of S when presented with a brief
excitation signal called an impulse (the Dirac delta func-
tion). Since the impulse signal contains all frequencies,
S is completely characterized by h. This means that for
any input x, the output of h can be calculated as the
convolution y[t] = h[t] ∗ x[t].
B. Acoustic Signal Processing
Our technique is inspired by the domain of acoustic signal
processing. Therefore, we will now briefly cover this topic to
give the reader a better understanding of our technique.
In the domain of acoustic signal processing, a sound which
reverberates through the air, and the environment (e.g., room)
which reflects and affects the vibrations as they propagate,
are the signal x and LTI system S respectively. An acoustic
engineer can model S by extracting its impulse response h.
This can be achieved by emitting an excitation signal x at one
location while simultaneously recording the resulting signal y
at another location. In this case, the input to S is generated by a
speaker and the output is captured by a microphone. There are
several methods for extracting an acoustic impulse response
with an excitation signal. These methods can be categorized
as either being direct or indirect (visualized in Fig. 3):
Direct Methods. Direct methods involve an excitation signal
x which is similar to that of a Dirac function, so that y =
h. However, since it is impossible to generate a true Dirac
signal in an acoustic environment, short loud sounds are
used instead. For example, popping a balloon, generating
a spark, and firing a gun.
Indirect Methods. An approximation of h can be obtained
indirectly from a non-Dirac excitation signal. The process
involves deconvolving the excitation signal x with the
resulting output signal y [23]. One well-known excitation
signal is the maximal length sequence (MLS) signal. An
MLS is a pseudorandom binary sequence generated from
maximal linear feedback shift registers. With m registers,
the generator produces a random binary sequence of
length N = 2m − 1 which is spectrally flat. As a
result, an MLS excitation signal produces all frequencies,
closely resembles white noise, and is robust in noisy and
populated environments [24].
Once the impulse response h has been extracted from S,
it can be used to perform a convolution reverb (a digital
simulation of an audio environment on sound). For example,
the response can be used to make a recorded piece of music to
sound like it was played in a particular cave or arena. We can
see from this that h is dependent on the shape of the room, the
materials of the surfaces, and the positioning of the speaker
and microphone. Any alteration to these physical parameters
will cause a noticeable affect on the impulse response. In
other words, an impulse response can be seen as an acoustical
signature of the environment.
To illustrate this concept, Fig. 4 presents two impulse
responses extracted from different environments. The initial
Dirac pulse (e.g., balloon pop sound) can be seen at the
beginning, followed by dynamic reverberations and echoes
(i.e., spikes). The figure shows that each environment has its
own unique signature due to their unique constructs.
C. Ping Signal Processing
Our approach to MitM detection is to (1) model a LAN as
an acoustic environment, (2) emit excitation signals, (3) model
the echoed response signals, and (4) detect abnormal changes
in newly sampled responses.
In networks, there are no reverberations of sound waves.
However, switches, network interfaces, and operating sys-
tems all affect a packet’s travel time across a network. The
hardware, buffers, caches, and even the software versions of
the devices which interact with the packets, all affect packet
timing. This is analogous to how a sound wave is affected as
it reverberates off various surfaces.
To capture packet timing between a local host and an
end-host, one can use the Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) [25]. The ICMP is a popular protocol used to gain
feedback about problems in an IP network. One of the features
of this protocol is the Echo_Request command, commonly
used to determine whether a host is operational. When a host
sends another host an Echo_Request, the target host returns
an ICMP Echo_Reply. Upon receiving the Echo_Reply,
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Fig. 5: An illustration of the ICMP RTT model. The propaga-
tion time has been exaggerated for visualization purposes.
the sender can measure the round-trip-time (RTT) to and
from the receiver. This process is referred to as ‘pinging’. To
according to the ICMP standard (RFC 1122: 3.2.2.6), one may
include data (a payload) in an Echo_Request. In this case,
the receiver must include the same data in the Echo_Reply.
The RTT of an ICMP packet over a LAN is dependent
on the number of switches (hops) traversed, since interactive
networking elements (e.g., switches) must fully buffer each
received frame before transmitting. The RTT is also dependent
on the current load and the hardware/software implementation
of each networking element along the path of the ping. With
this in mind, we present the following RTT model (illustrated
in Fig. 5):
Let hi(t) denote the time it takes to transfer an Ethernet
frame between the two network elements at the i-th hop at
time t. Assuming the frame is B bytes long, we model it as
hi(t) = prop + B (trans + proci(t)) (1)
where prop is the propagation time on the wire (approx. the
speed of light), trans is the transmission time for a single
byte, and proci(t) is the average processing time per byte at
the transmitting element at time t (e.g., parsing and buffering).
For simplicity, we will assume that all switches in the LAN
are identical. As a result, using (1) we can model the trip time
(TT) from host i to host j as
TTi j(t) = h1(t)+ h2(t + h1)+ . . . + hk(t + h1 + . . . + hk−1) (2)
Finally, we can use (2) to model the RTT between host i and
host j, sent at time t, as
RTTi j(t) = TTi j(t) + B · replyj(t) + TTji(t + TTi j) (3)
where replyj(t) is the average time it takes for host j to
process each byte in an ICMP echo reply, at time t.
With the assistance of the model in (3), we will now define
our system and its signals.
1) System Definition (S)
Let S be a LAN environment consisting of one or more
switches and numerous hosts. Let Si j be the LAN in the
perspective of host i communicating with host j, where i and
j are within the same LAN.
We define the input signal x to S as a sequence of ICMP
Echo_Request frames, where x[n] ∈ {42, 43, . . . , 1542}
are the number of bytes which are transmitted in the ICMP
Echo_Request: 42 bytes for the Ethernet, IPv4, and ICMP
protocol headers, plus an additional 0-1500 bytes for the ICMP
payload). We define the output signal y as a sequence of RTTs,
computed from the respective ICMP Echo_Reply packets’
arrival times. More formally,
y[n] = Trx[n] − Ttx[n] (4)
where Ttx[n] is the transmission timestamp of the n-th
Echo_Request in x, and Trx[n] is the reception time of
the resulting Echo_Reply.
When the random sized requests in x are sent back-to-
back at a fast rate, the electronics, caching mechanisms, CPU
schedulers, and queuing algorithms of each network element
dynamically affect the respective proc(t) and reply(t) in
response to the varying load. Since the payloads in x reflect an
MLS signal, y captures Si j’s fingerprint (impulse response).
Empirical evidence can be shown via linear regression. In
brief, we found that the k-th RTT in y has a dependency on
the random sizes of previously transmitted ICMP requests in
x. More formally, y[k] ∼ x[1], x[2], . . . , x[k]. We also found
that an 18% reduction in error can be achieved by considering
x[1], . . . , x[k] as the descriptor variables as opposed to just
x[k]. An example of this dependency can be visualized in
Fig. 7. The figure plots the RTT distribution of the i-th ping
in a back-to-back burst of 50 pings (sent 1500 times). If there
were no dependency, then the distribution of the i-th and j-th
ping would be identical.
Fig. 7 also shows that the first pings are noisier than those
which follow (e.g., due to caching). This is another reason why
we must send x at a fast rate, and not as individual pings. In
our system, we set the transmission rate of x to
fs ≡ 2
µRTT ∗
(5)
where µRTT ∗ denotes the average RTT time of largest ping
possible (a 1542 byte Ethernet frame). This rate ensures that
y captures the system well, while not overloading the end-host.
2) Ping Excitation Signal (x)
In order to capture a characterization of Si j , we use an MLS
excitation signal as our input x.
To transmit a binary MLS, we modulate the sequence
over the minimum and maximum ICMP payload sizes. For
example, one possible N = 7 length MLS may be s =
{1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0}. In this case, s would be translated into the
transmission signal x = {1542, 1542, 1542, 42, 1542, 42, 42}.
Fig. 6 illustrates an m = 10 bit (N = 1023 length) sequence
modulated as the input signal x, and then received as the output
signal y.
There are several reasons why we use the MLS method over
other known excitation methods:
• The MLS method is known to be robust in noisy en-
vironments, such as a room populated with conversing
individuals [24]. Network traffic can affect Si j , thus it is
appropriate to assume the system will be noisy.
• An MLS of sufficient length has subsequences of ‘1’s.
This results in bursts of pings which have the maximum
size of 1500. This burst causes a momentary stress on
the network which is reflected in the output y, thus better
capturing the network’s characteristics.
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Fig. 7: The distribution of each ping’s RTT, when sending a
burst of 50 pings back-to-back. The data was collected over
1500 trials with a direct host-to-host Ethernet connection.
• An MLS is randomly generated each time, thus raising
the difficulty for an attacker to perform a replay attack
(discussed in detail later in section VII).
3) Echo Response Signal (y)
The system’s output y, from the excitation signal x, contains
the impulse response h.
In order for h to fully characterize Si j , the system Si j
must be LTI. However, since RTTs are dependent the media’s
propagation time (prop), there is non-linear relationship and
Si j does not abide to the homogeneity principal. Therefore,
strictly speaking, Si j is not LTI.
However, when modeled over a short interval as a snapshot
of the network, Si j can be described as an LTI system, and
it’s impulse response can significantly capture the system’s
characteristics at that moment:
Si j is a non-linear system because the propagation time
prop. However, since prop is close to the speed of light, this
term is negligible with respect to the rest of the timing model
in (3). Therefore, prop has no significant affect on the system,
and Si j can be viewed as a linear system.
Si j is time-variant because proc(t) and reply(t) are depen-
dent on the load of the LAN and the end-host, which changes
over time. Let S(t)i j be the state of the system Si j at time t. Let
x(t) and y(t) be the respective input and output of the system
at time t. If x(t) is significantly short, then processing times
of S(t)i j can be approximated as constants. Therefore, snapshots
of Si j are independently time-invariant.
In summary, Si j cannot be characterized with a single
response to an MLS signal. However, by sampling the dis-
tribution of Si j’s impulse responses, we can implicitly capture
Si j’s characterization over time. Therefore, a collection of echo
responses can be used to model Si j’s normal behavior (see
section V-E).
4) ICMP Echo Response Jitter (z)
Jitter is the time lapse between two consecutive packet ar-
rivals. We denote the jitter values of the ICMP echo responses
as z, defined as
z[t] = Trx[t] − Trx[t − 1] (6)
The bottom of Fig. 6 plots an example of the jitter resulting
from the MLS signal x. In this example, we can see that the
jitter is distributed at distinct high (650 usec), medium (390
usec), and low (50 usec) levels. The three distinct levels are
the result of the transitions between adjacent bits in the MLS
binary sequence. For instance, whenever a ‘10’ appears in the
sequence, the jitter is small. This is because the RTT of a 42
byte packet (’0’) is shorter than that of a 1542 byte packet
(‘1’). Since the pings are sent at a rate of fs , the response for
the ‘0’ arrives shortly after the response for the ‘1’.
Although z is not part of our system model Si j , it captures
additional characteristics of the channel between i and j. For
example, additional processing delays and moments of stress
on the participating network elements.
V. VESPER
In this section, we present the MitM detector Vesper: the
framework, machine learning process, and deployment.
A. Overview
Vesper is a plug-and-play man-in-the-middle detector based
on ping echo-analysis. The detector is installed on a local host
within a LAN, and protects the local host from MitM attacks
originating from within the same LAN. In this section, we
use Γ to denote the set of known remote hosts in the LAN,
excluding the local host.
Vesper’s framework has the following main components:
• Orchestrator (OR): The component responsible for
adding new local IPs (hosts) automatically, and deciding
which link in the LAN should be probed when.
• Link Prober (LP): The component responsible for
probing the hosts in Γ. Each probe produces an MLS
excitation signal (x), which results in the echo response
signal (y) and the echo response jitter (z).
• Feature Extractor (FE): The component responsible for
summarizing the result of a probe. The summary forms
a feature vector ®v ∈ R3.
• Host Profiler (HP): The component responsible for
detecting the presence of a MitM using ®v. It accomplishes
this by profiling the link to each host j ∈ Γ with an
autoencoder. The autoencoder is trained to recognize
the link’s normal behavior. An autoencoder is a neural
network which can be used as an anomaly detector
(discussed later in section V-E).
Vesper operates by performing the following steps (illus-
trated in Fig. 8):
Vesper’s MitM Detection Procedure
I. Orchestrator
1) At a random time, a random network host j ∈ Γ is
selected and the detection process is initiated.
II. Link Prober
2) The MLS Generator produces the random binary se-
quence s.
3) The MLS Modulator creates the ping excitation signal
x based on the binary sequence s.
4) The Excitation Emitter sends host j a total of N
Echo_Request packets, according to x, and at a
rate of fs . In parallel, the Echo Receiver captures j’s
Echo_Reply packets.
5) Once all N Echo_Reply packets have been received,
the MLS Demodulator extracts the echo response signal
y and the echo response jitter z.
III. Feature Extractor
6) The Impulse Extractor, DC Extractor, and KS-Tester
use x, y, and z to produce the feature vector ®v.
IV. Host Profiler
7) The IP address of j is used to retrieve j’s autoencoder
via a hashmap.
8) Using ®v, the autoencoder determines whether or not the
link with host j has been significantly altered. If ®v is
determined to be normal (with high confidence), then
the autoencoder learns from the instance ®v. Otherwise,
an alert is raised.
We will now discuss the each of Vesper’s main components
in greater detail.
B. Orchestrator (OR)
Whenever a new IP address from the same subnet as Vesper
is observed in the network traffic, or added by the user, the
OR pings that address. If none of the pings traverse a router
(indicated by TTL field of the IPv4 header) then the address
is added to Γ. After sending each probe, at a random time
within the next second, the OR selects a random host i ∈ Γ
and initiates a probe via the LP.
C. Link Prober (LP)
After generating s and x, the LP transmits Echo_Request
packets to the target host, according to x. The
Echo_Request packets are transmitted every 1fs =
1
2 µRTT ∗
seconds. This means that the transmission and reception
of ICMP packets must be performed concurrently on two
separate threads: the Excitation Emitter and Echo Receiver.
In order to measure the RTT of each ping correctly,
each Echo_Request must be associated with its respective
Echo_Reply. To accomplish this, the Excitation Emitter
places the current index of x into the Sequence_Number
field of the Echo_Request header. When a host replies,
it copies the same value from the Echo_Request into the
header of its Echo_Reply. The Identifier field is used
to differentiate between separate excitation signals.
In order to obtain the necessary accuracy, the LP records
all transmission and reception timestamps with nanosecond
resolution. In C++, and with a Linux kernel, this can be accom-
plished using the <time.h> library’s clock_gettime()
with the CLOCK_MONOTONIC option enabled.1
When the last Echo_Reply is received, y and z are
computed, and the raw probe data (x, y, z) is passed to the
FE for feature extraction.
D. Feature Extractor (FE)
After each probe, the FE is tasked with extracting the
following three features from (x, y, z):
vEh : The impulse response energy using x and y
vrtt∗: The mean RTT from the largest packets sent in x
vjit : The log-likelihood of the jitter’s distribution (z)
The feature vector ®v = {vEh , vrtt∗, vjit } summarizes the state
of the probed channel (system Si j). After the FE computes ®v,
the vector is passed to the HP for inspection. Fig. 10 plots
each of the features before and after a MitM attack.
1The API instructs the OS to collect the time from a CPU register. On a
Dell PC, we found the error to be at worst 0.015% w.r.t. the smallest possible
RTT (150 usec with a host-to-host direct Ethernet link).
Fig. 8: The framework of Vesper, deployed on a network host.
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Fig. 9: The three features extracted from probes over time where the dashed line indicates the start of an IL-DH MitM attack.
1) Impulse Response Energy (vEh )
When Eve intercepts Alice’s traffic, Eve affects the dynam-
ics of the channel between Alice and Bob. Even when Eve
responds to Alice’s ICMP traffic on behalf of Bob, the impulse
response h, captured by y, changes. This is because Alice has
different hardware and software than Bob.
The Impulse Extractor summarizes the state of the system
Si j with h, where i is the local host. It accomplishes this
by measuring the energy of h, denoted Eh . As mentioned
in section IV-B, through a process called deconvolution, the
response h can be obtained from the output y by knowing the
excitation signal x.
In an LTI system, the output can be expressed as
y[t] = h[t] ∗ x[t] (7)
where ∗ is the convolution operator, and h is the system’s
impulse response. To extract impulse response in the absence
of noise, we can perform the deconvolution
h[t] = F −1{Y/X} (8)
where F −1 is inverse of the Discreet Fourier Transform (DFT),
and where Y and X are the Fourier Transforms of the signals
y and x respectively.
Using Parseval’s theorem [23], we can obtain Eh without
the need for computing the inverse DFT in (8) by computing
Eh =
1
N
N∑
k=1
Y [k]X[k] 2 (9)
The resulting value used as the feature vEh in ®v.
2) Mean RTT of the Largest Packets (vrtt∗)
In Fig. 1, it can be seen that a both MitM attack scenarios
add an additional 2·Thop delay to Alice’s traffic. We can detect
this additional delay by averaging the values (RTTs) in y.
We note that the duration of Thop increases with the length
of the Ethernet frame. Approximately 50% of the packets in
x have the maximum length of 1542 bytes. By averaging
the RTTs of those frames only, we obtain a better separation
between benign the malicious scenarios. Fig. 10 illustrates the
benefit of averaging the 1542 byte frames in each response y.
This average is extracted from each y by the DC Extractor,
and used as the feature vRTT∗ in ®v.
3) Log-likelihood of the Jitter’s Distribution (vjit )
As mentioned in section IV-C4, the jitter of the
Echo_Reply packets (z) captures the behavior of the net-
working elements between the sender and receiver. Concretely,
since x is transmitted at a rate of fs , it can be expected that
some packets may be being queued, and then transmitted back-
to-back. This dynamic behavior characterizes the network’s
elements, and can be used to help fingerprint the connection
with host j.
Fig. 11 plots z’s distribution, with and without the presence
of a MitM attack. Fig. 11 shows that the three levels of
jitter (refer to section IV-C4) are affected by the attack. To
detect abnormalities in this distribution, the FE performs a
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. The KS test is
a nonparametric statistical test which results in a probability
value (p-value) that indicates how likely two sample distribu-
tions come from the same distribution. We denote this value
as pX,Y , where X and Y are tested distributions.
The KS Tester stores m samples of host j’s jitter distribu-
tions. These samples are used as references for the channel’s
expected behavior. We denote host j’s references as the set
Z j = z1, z2, . . . , zm. Although m is a parameter of Vesper , in
practice m = 5 works well.
Let z0 denote the jitter distribution given to the FE for
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
de
ns
ity
Channel State
MitM
Clean
42 Byte Frames Only
0.000
0.005
0.010
200 300 400 500 600 700
RTT [msec]
de
ns
ity
1542 Byte frames Only
Fig. 10: The distribution of y’s RTTs, when exclusively
considering the 42 byte or 1542 byte frames, with and without
an IL-DH MitM. The bars mark each of the means.
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Fig. 11: The distribution of a probe’s response jitter (z), with
and without the presence of an IL-DH MitM.
feature extraction. With z0, the KS Tester computes the value
pjit = log[max{pz0,z1, pz0,z2, . . . pz0,zm }] (10)
The last k computations of pjit (from previous probes) are
averaged to form the feature vjit . In practice, we found that
k = 15 produces good results. If vjit ≈ 0, then the KS Tester
randomly decides whether or not to update Z j with z0. In (10),
we take the maximum p-value, since this makes the feature
more robust against false positives.
E. Host Profiler (HP)
The HP component uses autoencoders to perform the basic
anomaly detection. First, we will explain in detail how an
autoencoder works, and then we will explain how the HP uses
them to detect anomalies in the link with host j.
1) Autoencoders
An autoencoder is an artificial neural network (ANN) which
is trained to reconstruct it’s inputs [26]. During training, an
autoencoder tries to learn the function
hθ (®x) ≈ ®x (11)
where θ is the learned parameters of the ANN, and ®x ∈ Rn is
an instance (observation). It can be seen that an autoencoder is
essentially trying to learn the identity function of the original
data distribution. Therefore, constraints are placed on the
network, forcing it to learn more meaningful concepts and
relationships between the features in ®x. The most common
constraint is to limit the number of neurons in the inner layers
of the network. The narrow passage causes the network to
learn compact encodings and decodings of the input instances.
If an instance does not belong to the learned concepts,
then we expect the reconstruction to have a high error. The
reconstruction error can be computed by taking the root
mean squared error (RMSE) between the input ®x and the
reconstructed output ®y. The RMSE between two vectors is
defined as
r®x, ®y =
√∑n
i=1 (xi − yi)2
n
(12)
where n is the dimensionality of the input vectors.
In order to determine whether or not the observation ®x is an
anomaly, we set a cut-off probability pthr , and test if p(X >
r®x, ®y′) < pthr assuming that X ∼ N(µr, σr ), where µr and σr
are sample statistics taken from the benign instances’ RMSEs.
2) The Anomaly Detection Procedure
To detect anomalies, the HP component maintains an au-
toencoder for each j ∈ Γ (denoted Aj). The task of Aj is
to (1) learn the normal behavior of the system Si j via each
probe ®v taken from host j, and (2) raise an alert if a sample
®v is abnormal. The HP accomplishes this in a plug-and-play
fashion by continuously training Aj on non-anomalous data,
and by giving Aj a grace period to converge before execution
(e.g., only after training on 100 observations). In summary,
the HP performs the following steps when instance ®v arrives:
The Procedure of the HP Component
1) The model Aj is retrieved via a hashmap, with host j
as the key.
2) Execute(®v): ®v is propagated through Aj to produce
the reconstruction ®v′.
3) The reconstruction error is computed as r®v, ®v′ , using µr
and σr .
4) if p(X > r®v, ®v′) < pthr , and the grace period is over,
an alert is raised.
5) else if an alert was not detected within the last
several probes:a
a) Train(®v, ®v): Using ®v, the weights in Aj are up-
dated once using SGD and the back-propagation
algorithm [27].
b) µr and σr are updated with r®v, ®v′ .
6) The anomaly score r®v, ®v′ is logged.
aReduces the chance of learning from a false negative.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we refer to the device on which Vesper is
installed as Alice, and Bob as the device whose channel with
Alice is under attack.
We evaluated Vesper in detecting EP-TD, IL-NB, IL-DH
and IP-DH MitM attacks (see Table I). For the EP-TD MitM
attack, we used a Kali Linux Desktop PC which performed an
ARP poising attack. For the IL-NB and IL-DH MitM attacks,
Fig. 12: Plots of the anomaly scores produced by Vesper when installed on a
laptop PC (Alice), and in the presence of one intermediary switch. The rows
indicate the victim (Bob), and the columns indicate the MitM attack (Eve).
Fig. 13: Vesper detecting IP-DH MitM at-
tacks. The scores before applying a 1 min
averaging window are marked in gray.
Fig. 14: Vesper’s performance in detecting IL MitMs in a large
LAN over multiple intermediary switches. The scores before
applying 10 sec averaging window are marked in gray.
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switches during the day.
we used a Raspberry Pi 3B and a 1Gbps Ethernet switch
respectively. The Pi was provided with an extra Ethernet
adapter, and configured to operate as a network bridge. For
the IP-DH MitM attacks, we used three 1Gbps switches: an
advanced feature (SW1), basic (SW2), and PoE (SW3) switch.
In this section, we refer to each of the devices in the above
setups as the attacker Eve. In our experiments, we used a C++
implementation of Vesper, set the autoencoder learning rate to
l = 0.1, the KS-Tester parameters to m = 5 and k = 15, and
the MLS probe length to N = 1023.
In order to evaluate Vesper’s accuracy when operating in
different sized LANs, we examined two setups: (1) when Alice
connects to the same switch as Bob (one intermediary switch),
and (2) when Alice connects several switches away from Bob
(multiple intermediary switches). In both setups, Vesper was
evaluated in the presence of a wide variety of real-world traffic,
while the end-hosts were actively using the network. We will
now present our experimental results accordingly.
A. One Intermediary Switch
For the EP and IL MitMs, we experimented on two LANs
(1) a surveillance camera network, and (2) a LAN segment
populated with active servers. The surveillance network con-
sisted 8 high-end HD Sony cameras and three PCs. The server
LAN segment consisted of one large switch connected to
61 active servers. Alice was a Kali Linux laptop PC (Intel
i5 CPU), and Bob was either a camera (SNC-EB602R), a
Windows desktop PC workstation (Intel i7 CPU), or a data
server (Intel Xeon E5-2660 CPU) in each experiment. The
desktop PC was located in the surveillance network.
We performed the EP-DH, IL-NB and IL-DH attacks on
each of the three versions of Bob, with duration of 3 hours
each. Fig. 12 shows RMSE scores produced by Vesper in each
of experiments (at the moment of the attack). Each point in
the figure represents the result of a single probe, and the color
indicates the probe’s abnormality.
For the IP-DH attack, we trained Vesper on one switch, and
then swapped the switch with a different one. Fig. 13 presents
the results from the IP-DH attacks.
In all experiments, the IL-NB was the easiest MitM attack to
detect. This is because the Pi must perform additional logic in
the kernel in order to bridge each ICMP packet. In contrast, the
IL-DH and IP-DH were the most difficult to detect, because the
packet interception was performed by dedicated hardware. We
also note that there were 15 false positives in the experiment
with the Server and the IL-DH due to a momentary disconnect.
However, these FPs can be easily be mitigated by using an
averaging window over the scores. This is because the mean
of the scores’ distribution significantly changes as seen in Fig.
TABLE II: A summary of this paper’s experiments and results with regards to Vesper’s MitM detection performance.
Figure: 12 13 14 18 
MitM Attack 
Topology EP IL IL EP IL IL EP IL IL IP IP IP IL IL IL IL IL 
Implementation TD DH NB TD DH NB TD DH NB DH DH DH NB DH NB DH DH 
Alice Dell Laptop Dell Laptop Dell Laptop Dell PC Dell PC (Lab Workstation) Laptop 
Bob SNC-EB602R Camera Dell PC Intel Xeon E5 Server Dell Laptop Dell PC (Secretary) PC 
Eve 
Dell 
PC 
Rasp. 
PI 3B 
1Gbps 
Switch 
Dell 
PC 
Rasp. 
PI 3B 
1Gbps 
Switch 
Dell 
PC 
Rasp. 
PI 3B 
1Gbps 
Switch 
Basic 
Switch 
PoE 
Switch 
PoE 
Switch 
Rasp. 
PI 3B 
1Gbps 
Switch 
Rasp. 
PI 3B 
1Gbps 
Switch 
1Gbps 
Switch 
Attack Vector 
Install 
Malw. 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Install 
Malw. 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Install 
Malw. 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Replace 
Adva. 
Replace 
Adva. 
Replace 
Basic 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Add 
Device 
Environment 
Description Surveillance Network Surveillance Network Server Network Basic LAN Large Office Network Surv. 
Num. Switches in the LAN 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 1 1 1 14 14 14 14 7 
Num. Intermediary Switches 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4+ 4+ 4+ 4+ 4+ 
Num. of hosts in the LAN 13 13 13 13 13 13 61 61 61 2 2 2 379 379 379 379 13 
Time of Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Day Night Night Day 
Experiment 
Total Probes Sent 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 
Approximate Duration [hr] 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Vesper’s 
Detection 
Performance 
Area under the Curve (AUC) 1 0.9998 1 1 0.9997 1 0.9957 0.9952 0.9999 0.9999 0.9973 0.9999 0.9997 0.9978 0.9908 0.9992 0.9989 
Equal Error Rate (EER) 0 0.0001 0 0 0.0063 0 0.0088 0.0096 0.0008 0.0002 0.0170 0.0002 0.0004 0.0070 0.0089 0.0016 0.0203 
Recall (TPR) 1 0.9997 1 1 0.9931 1 0.9856 0.9984 0.9986 1 0.6536 1 1 0.9890 0.9935 1 0.8667 
False Alarm Rate* (FPR) 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 0.0096 0 0.0002 0.0028 0.0002 0.0004 0.0040 0.0089 0.0016 0 
Accuracy 1 0.9998 1 1 0.9965 1 0.9928 0.9945 0.9993 0.9999 0.8250 0.9999 0.9998 0.9926 0.9922 0.9992 0.9327 
Precision 1 0.9999 1 1 1 1 1 0.9908 1 0.9998 0.9957 0.9998 0.9996 0.9956 0.9904 0.9982 1 
Detection Delay [sec] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
*By using an averaging window of 60 seconds, all false positives in this table are mitigated. However, doing do incurs and additional delay in the detection time.
12. However, the trade-off with using averaging window is that
it causes a detection delay. Here, we found that a window size
of one minute reduces the number of false positives to zero.
B. Multiple Intermediary Switches
To evaluate Vesper across multiple intermediary switches,
we used an organization’s office LAN. The LAN consisted of
over 379 network hosts connected through 14 large Ethernet
switches, some of which used optical fiber uplinks. The hosts
consisted of workstations, servers, printers, and IoT devices.
The test scenario involved Alice (a desktop PC), and Bob (the
secretary’s PC) which were located on opposite sides of the
LAN (separated by four large switches). The probes were sent
for three hours, and the attacks (Eve) were IL MitMs only.
Fig. 14 shows Vesper’s RMSE scores during the day (busy
hours) and during the night. The additional traffic during the
day caused several false positives when detecting the IL-DH.
However, by using an averaging window of 10 seconds, we
were able to mitigate the errors completely. The results show
that Vesper can detect IL MitMs sufficiently well in large
noisey LANs, especially during off-hours.
C. Profile Train Time
A concern with Vesper is that should a change occur in the
LAN’s topology, the affected models in the HP component
must be retrained. When retrained during busy hours, in
the event of an IL MitM, we found that Vesper reaches
a false positive rate of zero within seconds (5-15 probes)
when applied over one switch, and approximately a minute
when applied across multiple switches (the large office LAN).
Therefore, although Vesper is vulnerable during training, the
attacker is challenged with deploying the MitM attack within
a narrow time window. To make this window even smaller,
Vesper can send probes at a faster rate during the grace period.
Fig. 16 shows Vesper’s performance over time, in the case
of multiple switches during day-time traffic. The performance
was measured in AUC [28], interpretation: (1.0) Vesper was a
perfect detector, (0.5) Vesper was randomly guessing.
D. Probe Length
Fig. 15 shows how the parameter N increases the separation
between the normal probes and anomalous probes. Although
the use of longer probes improves accuracy, there is a trade-
off with bandwidth. Vesper sends one probe per second, and
a probe has an average of N( 42+15422 ) bytes. For example,
with an N = 1023, the bandwidth used is approximately 810
Kbps. This rate is practical, especially since the probe traffic
is contained within the LAN. However, a user should consider
the number of Vesper instances installed to appropriately
configure N according to his/her limitations.
VII. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Our base assumption in this paper is that the MitM attack
is introduced to the network after Vesper. However, even if
Alice installs Vesper before Eve arrives, Eve can still attempt
to evade detection.
We identify four possible adversarial attacks against Vesper
(illustrated in Fig. 17): DoS, Spoof, Replay, and Bypass.
Vesper can detect these evasions through the three features
which the FE extracts from each probe. Each of the features is
strong at detecting one particular attack, but weak at detecting
another. However, when combined, the three features provide
good protective coverage. Table III maps this relationship and
provides a summary of each of the feature’s strengths and
weaknesses. We will now discuss the detection capabilities of
each feature with respect to each evasion.
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Fig. 17: The path of the ICMP packets sent from Vesper during
each of the adversarial attacks.
TABLE III: The capabilities of each feature under each attack,
and a summary of the features’ strengths and weaknesses.
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A. DoS
In a DoS attack against Vesper, Eve drops Echo_Request
packets en route to Bob so that Alice never receives the signal
y. All features are strong against this attack because in the
event of a loss-of-signal, a time-out occurs which causes a
large spike in the f atures’ values.
B. Spoof
In a spoof attack against Vesper, Eve replies to
Echo_Request packets en route to Bob, on behalf of Bob.
In this way, no additional hops are added to the packet’s path.
vrtt∗ is weak during a spoof attack by a EP MitM. This
is because the average RTT remains statistically the same.
However, vrtt∗ s modest against spoof att cks with an IL
MitM b cause the affect on the feature depends on the location
of the MitM (i.e., placing the IL MitM in front of Bob reduces
the RTT time). Moreover, if both Alice and Bob have an
instance of Vesper, then Eve will be detected by one of them.
Although the impulse response changes in the presence of
a MitM, there is a possibility of collision in the feature space
because we take the average of the signal’s energy. Therefore,
vEh is modest against spoof attacks by an EP MitM. However,
when launched from an IL MitM, vEh is strong because the
topological placement of the MitM highly affects vEh . vjit
is strong against a spoof attack because the distribution of
the jitter signal acts as a good fingerprint of the end-host’s
processing behaviors.
We note that the spoof attack is a difficult evasion to detect
if (1) an EP MitM is used, and (2) the network topology
Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve are identical. Regardless, even if
Eve succeeds at replicating the exact hardware, firmware, and
software of Bob’s device, (1) Eve will only be able to attack
the link with Bob, but not Carol (who has a different device),
and (2) there are minute difference in Bob’s hardware which
truly give Bob’s device a unique signature, thus making it
difficult for Alice to spoof a reply from Bob.
Identical switches and end-devices obtain their ‘fingerprints’
from imperfections in the manufacturing process [29], [30].
Vesper captures these fingerprints collectively in y. To demon-
strate the attacker’s challenge in reproducing Bob’s fingerprint,
we performed the following experiment: (1) A set of network
hosts Γ, from the same LAN, are selected. (2) Vesper (i.e.,
Alice) is trained to protect the link with host i ∈ Γ (Bob).
(3) After 2000 probes, host j ∈ Γ (Eve) begins replying to
Vesper instead of host i. (4) Steps 2-3 are repeated for every
combination of i, j ∈ Γ. The pair (i, j) is a spoof attack trial.
The above experiment was performed on two different
LANs: (Γas) an assortment of 100 networked computers in
a office LAN, and (Γpi) 46 Raspberry Pi 3B devices, all con-
nected to a single Ethernet switch. The results are summarized
in figures 20 and 21 in terms of AUC. The value of the AUC
has the following interpretation: (1.0) Vesper was a perfect
detector, (0.5) Vesper couldn’t differentiate between hosts i
and j, and (0.0) Vesper thought that that host j was host i.
The results show that Vesper is robust against spoof evasion
attacks. Even if an attacker uses the same hardware/software
as the victim, Vesper is likely to detect the change via the
echo-analysis which it performs.
C. Replay
In a replay attack against Vesper, whenever a probe x
is intercept d n ts way to Bob, Eve replays a previously
intercepted response signal y back to Alice.
vEh is strong against all replay attacks because it is depen-
dent on the MLS signal, and the MLS sequence is difficult to
predict in real-time.2 We note that the duration of a signal x
is not a constant and can be very noisy due to Alice’s host’s
scheduler. This strengthens the detection capabilities of vEh
and vrtt∗ in the case of a replay attack. This is because the
noise adds a nondeterministic skew to the t x times, which Eve
cannot predetermine. However, since Alice can unintentionally
mitigate the noise by using a dedicated hardware/software, we
consider vrtt∗ to be modestly secure against such attacks.
The vjit feature is very weak to replay attacks since the
feature is not dependent on the uniqueness of the MLS signal.
In Fig. 19, we present the affect a replay attack has on each
of the features (top), and show that the evasion is successfully
detected via the final computed anomaly score (bottom).
D. Bypass
In a bypass attack against Vesper, an advanced attacker uses
a special IL device which can choose to either (1) interact
with the network acting as a MitM (active-mode), or (2)
passively observe acting as a wiretap (passive-mode). To evade
detection, Eve is either (A) always in active-mode and switches
to passive-mode when an ICMP request is received, OR (B)
always in passive-mode and switches to active-mode only
whenever Eve wants to manipulate or inject traffic. Vesper
can only detect Eve while she is in active-mode.
Vesper can detect Eve if she uses (A). This is because, by the
time the first ICMP packet in x is detected by Eve, the frame
has already been partially buffered. Therefore, Eve must pass
x[1] through her regular interception process before switching
over to passive-mode (see Fig. 20 for results). Furthermore,
if Eve uses (B), then it is likely that Vesper will detect her.
This is because Eve must remain in active-mode for long
durations in order to be effective. For example, to manipulate
2This is true if each subsequent MLS seed is determined by a secure pseudo
random number generator, such as AES-256 in CTR-mode.
Fig. 18: Vesper’s detec-
tion of a IL-NB MitM
using bypass evasion.
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streaming/live data, maintain a compromised TCP connection,
or to intercept a choice packet.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As of today, MitM attacks are still pose a great threat to
many LANs. In this paper we have presented a new technique
for detecting MitM attacks in LANs via ping echo analysis. We
have shown how the technique can be practically applied via a
MitM detection framework called Vesper. Experimental results
show that (1) Vesper is capable of detecting end-point, in-line,
and in-point MitM attacks, and (2) is robust against possible
adversarial attacks. For future work, we plan on applying other
ping methods (e.g., TCP SYN), applying noise mitigation
techniques, and extending the technique to work over routers,
and applying Vesper to Wi-Fi networks.
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APPENDIX A
Fig. 22: The common hourly, daily, and monthly traffic loads
of the 50 port switch used in the detection experiment where
the Data Server was the victim (see Fig. 12).
Fig. 23: The MitM devices used in this paper. Top: Three
1Gbps Ethernet switches used in the IP-DH experiments,
where the middle switch was used in the IL-DH experiments.
Bottom: A Raspberry Pi 3B with a battery pack and 1Gbps
USB to Ethernet adapter, used in the IL-NB experiments.
Fig. 24: Two of the eight Sony IP surveillance cameras used
in the experiments. The models were: SNC-EM602RC, SNC-
EB600, SNC-EM600, and SNC-EB602R.
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Fig. 25: A break-down of the device’s operating systems, used
in 100 host spoof experiment.
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Fig. 26: A break-down of the devices running a Linux oper-
ating system, used in 100 host spoof experiment.
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Fig. 27: A break-down of the devices running a Microsoft
operating system, used in 100 host spoof experiment.
Fig. 28: The 46 Raspberry Pi 3Bs used in the experiments.
All of the devices were connected to a single Ethernet switch.
Fig. 29: The MLS generator used in the experiments. Note, on
line 21, the random number should be drawn from a secure
PRNG (e.g., AES-256 in CTR-mode).
Fig. 30: The packet interception process of an IL-DH MitM
device, with a bypass evasion mechanism. The device can
either actively or passively observe traffic.
APPENDIX B
In this section we show that there is a dependency between
the the k-th RTT in y to the payload k payload sizes of the
ICMP request packets sent prior in x. In our experiment, we
used two Desktop PCs running Kali Linux (denoted PC1 and
PC2), and a 1 Gbps Ethernet switch (SW). PC1 sent 20, 000
MLS input signals (X = {x1, x2, . . . x20,000}) and received
the respective 20, 000 output signals (Y = {y1, y2, . . .}). The
transmission rate of the ICMP packets in each input signal
was
fs =
2
µRTT ∗
=
2
0.0001763151
= 11343.33Hz (13)
With the collected input and output signals, we built the
linear regression model y[25] ∼ x[1], x[2], . . . , x[25]. In
other words, the model predicts yi[25] given the descriptors
xi[1], xi[2], . . . xi[25] for some xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y . The p-value
of each descriptor variable is available in Table IV.
TABLE IV: The linear dependencies of descriptor variables in
the regression model y[25] ∼ x[1], x[2], . . . , x[25].
The results demonstrate that the k-th RTT in the output
signal y is highly dependent on the k ICMP payload sizes
sent prior. We note that each input signal in X was a
completely random MLS sequence. Therefore, we conclude
that the observed statistical dependency is the result of a
dynamic reaction which SW and PC2 have to an MLS ping
input sequence. This indicates that the output signal y indeed
captures a representation
